From stealing to kneeling, what do NFL player contracts say about “bad” behavior?

From stealing to kneeling, what do NFL player contracts say about “bad” behavior?

Three times each year, two professional American football teams journey across the pond to play against each other in the NFL London Games. This weekend however, four players from the Jacksonville Jaguars made headlines for something they did off the field. They were arrested under suspicion of fraud by false representation for attempting to leave a nightclub without paying the £50,000 ($64,000) bar tab.

According to ProFootball Talk, expensive bottles of champagne and vodka were sent to the players’ table. They thought someone else was paying, and were surprised to learn that they were expected to pay. The bill was settled hours after the arrest, and the players were released with no further action taken by police. “There was definitely a misunderstanding,” said Barry Church, one of the players arrested. “We handled it as a private matter within the team, and we’ll just go from there.”

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Despite their fame and talent, at the end of the day, professional athletes are capable of making mistakes just like the rest of us. But unlike the rest of us, sports stars are often contractually obligated to maintain a positive reputation.

The NFL has had a formal policy addressing off-field conduct since 1997. The current 2014 Personal Conduct Policy prohibits physical violence, illegal possession of a gun or drugs, and cruelty to animals – remember Michael Vick and his dogfightingBut the policy also prohibits anything “that undermines or puts at risk the integrity of and public confidence in the NFL.” Even if a player’s conduct does not result in a criminal conviction, the NFL can impose fines, suspension, or even banishment from the league.

In addition to the NFL Policy, individual player contracts also contain “morality clauses.” Also known as a “moral turpitude clause” or “bad boy clause”, this permits an employer to end the contractual relationship if the employee’s conduct breaches the moral expectations laid out in the employment or endorsement agreement. For my overview of the history and use of morality clauses more generally, see Morality Clauses in Talent Contracts.

The 2012 contract between Arian Foster (“Player”) and the Houston Texans (“Club”) is available online thanks to a (fascinating) IPO filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Clauses regarding Foster’s behaviour and conduct included:

  • Player agrees to give his best efforts and loyalty to the Club, and to conduct himself on and off the field with appropriate recognition of the fact that the success of professional football depends largely on public respect for and approval of those associated with the game. 
  • If at any time, in the sole judgement of Club, Player has engaged in personal conduct reasonably judged by Club to adversely affect or reflect on Club, then Club may terminate this contract.
  • Player recognizes the detriment to the League and professional football that would result from impairment of public confidence in the integrity and good character of NFL players.

“Meaning Transference” and marketing magic

You might be wondering why a football team should care about the off-field behaviour of its players. As long as the guy can run the ball or block a tackle, who cares if he’s arrested for trying to skip out on a bar tab. Right? Wrong.

Consider for a moment the amount of money teams and companies invest in employment contracts and endorsement agreements. By way of example, Russell Wilson earned $2 million during his first three seasons with the Seattle Seahawks. In 2015, the Hawks rewarded their quarterback with a renewed contract worth nearly $90 million. Wilson also gets $10 million a year from his deals with Bose, Nike, and Alaska Airlines. On the other side of the country, the New York Giants’ wide receiver Odell Beckham Jr is earning about $10 million over four years. But the real kicker is that Nike recently signed him for the biggest shoe endorsement ever, worth $25 million over five years.

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“Seattle’s hometown airline” Alaska Airlines “couldn’t be more proud of Seattle’s football hero, Russell Wilson.” Thanks to Wilson’s impressive skill and wholesome image, they even made him their CFO! Chief Football Officer, that is.

Meaning Transference is a social theory which posits consumers “transfer” the perceived ideals, credibility and reputation of celebrities to the associated product or service being sold (Grant McCracken). Because negative perceptions can also transfer, a company will want to distance themselves if a celebrity behaves badly. Essentially, morality clauses protect the team or company’s public image from the athlete’s potential scandals. In practice, this could mean suspending or terminating the contract, which could cost the athlete thousands – or potentially millions – of dollars.

The crux of any morality clause is how the “bad behaviour” is defined. Does a player kneeling during the American national anthem adversely affect the image of the NFL?

Given today’s heated political climate, it’s no surprise that professional athletes are increasingly voicing – or otherwise demonstrating – their opinions on social issues. In 2016, Colin Kaepernick of the San Fransisco 49’s started the trend of protesting police brutality and racial inequality, by kneeling during the national anthem at the start of games. Other players soon joined in, much to the ire of many football fans and prominent figures, including President Trump. That same year, Kaepernick was deemed the most hated player in the NFL.

Speaking to The Washington Postconstitutional law Professor Fred Smith Jr. described the anthem debate as a “clash of values which has become a very fraught issue in the American political imagination.” The NFL reacted to the situation by announcing a new policy in May of this year: players must either stand for the national anthem on the field or wait in the locker room. The policy was then shut down by the NFL’s labour union (NFLPA) only two months later.

As the NFL and the NFLPA continue to negotiate, “no new rules relating to the anthem will be issued or enforced”. However, introduction of the new rules in the first place demonstrates that the NFL is at least attempting to mitigate the perception that it is an unpatriotic organisation. It could be argued that from the NFL’s perspective, it is the result of the public’s perception that matters, and not the conduct itself. 

In spite of the furor and uproar, Nike made a risky decision in September to feature Colin Kaepernick in an advertising campaign. Despite some backlash and boycotts, the move paid off handsomely overall: Nike received valuable free publicity, and online sales and stock price skyrocketed. In this way, Kaepernick’s kneeling is both detrimental to one organisation (the NFL), as well as highly profitable for another (Nike).

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Nike released a controversial commercial featuring Colin Kaepernick, which hints at the embroilment over NFL players kneeling during the American national anthem.

Ultimately, it is critical to understand that morality clauses attempt to regulate something that is continually in flux. Opponents of morality clauses worry that the definition of what constitutes “immoral” or damaging activity could be too broad and subject to abuse by the employer. Smart sports stars and their lawyers will therefore do well to ensure that morality clauses are carefully negotiated and written precisely in order to protect their position – and their paycheques.

“The Wife” and rights of attribution: an intellectual property perspective

“The Wife” and rights of attribution: an intellectual property perspective

* * * CONTAINS SPOILERS * * *

In The Wife, Glenn Close plays Joan Castleman, the steadfast and amenable wife of celebrated novelist Joseph Castleman. But when Joe wins the Nobel Prize in Literature, things start to unravel between them. Is there more to Joan’s support than meets the eye? In this post, I consider the merits of a hypothetical intellectual property dispute between the couple, and an often-neglected right in particular.

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The Wife is a 2018 film from Swedish director Björn Runge, starring Glenn Close and Jonathan Pryce. The script by Jane Anderson is based on Meg Wolitzer’s novel of the same name.

 

We first meet Joan Castleman – The Wife – the evening before her husband, celebrated novelist Joseph Castleman, wins the Nobel Prize in Literature. Praise and adoration for Joe’s prolific and highly acclaimed body of work are subsequently lavished upon him, while Joan and their two children watch on. But when the family arrives in Stockholm for the award ceremony, we begin to realise that Joe Castleman’s success rests on secrets and sacrifices.

Through the use of flashbacks to the 1950s and 1960s, we learn that Joan was a promising writer. While at college, her then-professor Joe Castleman encourages her writing, and the two eventually become romantically involved. But Joe is not content with merely lecturing about novels: he seeks to prove himself in the literary world as an author himself.

During a heated argument about his poorly written first attempt at a novel, Joe threatens to leave Joan. Desperate to keep him happy and aware of his deep desire for publication, Joan offers to “fix” Joe’s draft. Her amended version of The Walnut is published under Joe’s name, and becomes a literary sensation. For the next forty years, Joan continues to write as Joe gets all of the credit.

In Stockholm, Joan revisits The Walnut and considers the personal sacrifices she’s made in her marriage.

What makes The Wife so delicious to watch is the way in which Joan’s character transforms and gains a sense of agency. Having grown up in the sexist environs of mid-century America, Joan at first appears to have dutifully accepted her fate as an ignored, pushed-aside woman whose only roles have been “wife” and “mother.” The announcement of “Joe’s” Nobel Prize in 1996 serves as a catalyst, and through a series of small events Joan eventually gathers momentum and power – like a storm – to unleash her torrential anger. The Roger Ebert review perhaps puts it best, noting that Glenn Close’s Joan “undergoes a quietly powerful transformation from self-deprecating spouse to fiery force of nature.” The film ends on an uncertain yet quietly optimistic note, and we get the sense that Joan will reveal the truth – not only to her family, but to the public – in due course.

As I left the cinema, I found myself ruminating over Joan’s legal position. As the author of the novels, would she stand a chance at winning a copyright lawsuit?

Copyright arises automatically in original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. This means that from the moment an author expresses something unique in a tangible way – for example, by writing it down using a typewriter – the author obtains an intellectual property right in the work.

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A young Joan (played by Glenn Close’s daughter Annie Starke) supports her husband Joe in his literary ambitions (played by Henry Lloyd).

It’s pretty clear from the story that Joe did infringe Joan’s intellectual property. Unfortunately for Joan, even if she wanted to bring some sort of copyright lawsuit against her husband Joe, is is doubtful that she would win. Whereas a “negative defense” seeks to factually disprove an element of the plaintiff’s case, an “affirmative defense” defeats or mitigates the legal consequences of the defendant’s otherwise unlawful conduct.

Put simply, in my imagined Castleman copyright lawsuit scenario, Joe’s lawyers could admit that Joe stole Joan’s work, but argue that he’s innocent in the eyes of the law. Here are three ways in which this could be possible:

  • Firstly, a lawsuit for copyright infringement must typically be filed within the applicable limitation period. The US Copyright Act requires a civil lawsuit to be filed within three years after the infringing action occurred. As such, a copyright lawsuit concerning Joan’s older novels would be practically impossible.
  • Secondly, Joan’s conduct may evidence acquiescence, or consent. This means that Joan knowingly watched Joe infringe her IPRs, but failed to raise any objection to the infringement at the time. In some instances, silence or inaction can be a form of “inferred consent.”
  • Thirdly, if Joe can prove that he infringed Joan’s copyright believing in good faith that he was entitled to do so, estoppel could apply. “Estoppel” as a term might not known by many non-lawyers, but the fundamentals are rather straightforward: a court may prevent (estop) a person from making assertions or from going back on her word, thereby preventing unconscionable conduct.

 

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While working on a definitive biography of Joe Castleman, author Nathaniel Bone (played by Christian Slater) discovers some striking discrepancies in Joe’s writing style.

Nevertheless, Joan’s cause is not a hopeless one. As evidenced by Joan’s emotional attachment and identity tied to her novels, literary and artistic work often mean much more than just the economic value they can generate. The creations can be very special to the person who first produced them, and often speak to immense emotional and intellectual effort. As a result, copyright works can be protected in ways that are different to traditional forms of property.

Moral rights are a type of non-economic rights which are considered personal to an author, in that they are inalienable and fundamental to the individual. Even if an author assigns the intellectual property rights to her novels to a third party, she will still maintain the moral rights to the work.

Chief among the moral rights is the right of attribution, which is the right of an author to be credited as the author of a work in question. Moral rights have a long history in international copyright law, and are set out in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, which governs international copyright law:

(1) Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.

Moral rights are well established in European legal systems, especially in French and German law. By contrast, moral rights in the United States have been somewhat neglected, as American law traditionally puts more significance on protecting economic interests. This has been changing in recent years however. In 2017, the US Copyright Office commenced a study to review how existing American law, including provisions found in Title 17 of the U.S. Code and other federal and state laws, protects the moral rights of attribution and integrity.

The laws which govern intellectual property rights have been forced to change in the face of challenges posed by the internet, disruptive technologies and an increasingly mobile population. Might moral rights be next on the agenda for American copyright reform? For Joan Castleman at least – whose conflict focuses almost entirely upon her identity and recognition as a writer – it’s easy to see why moral rights could be so important.

Sir Cliff Richards v BBC: is publicity the soul of justice?

Sir Cliff Richards v BBC: is publicity the soul of justice?

You don’t have to be a privacy or media lawyer to have heard of the sex abuse allegations levied against celebrities in the entertainment industry over the last few years. The investigations concerning Sir Cliff Richard, a famous British musician, included a widely-televised raid on his estate in Berkshire by South Yorkshire Police. Nearly four years after the BBC first named and shamed Sir Cliff in what is now considered to have been “sensationalist” journalism, the High Court has determined that his rights of privacy were infringed.

What makes this case so interesting is that it does not focus on defamation —that is, the publication (or voicing) of a statement which adversely affects another person’s reputation. Instead, Sir Cliff won his case on the basis that the BBC’s wrongful disclosure of his private information was an invasion of his privacy. 

In Sir Cliff Richard v BBC and South Yorkshire Policethe Court considered if suspects who have not been formally charged by police have a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the criminal investigation. How are an individual’s rights to privacy balanced against the freedom of expression enjoyed by media organisations? That the suspect in this case is a celebrity only complicates matters, as it calls into question the importance publishing private details in the name of public interest.

Prosecutors said in 2016 that there was not enough evidence to justify criminal charges against Mr. Richard, one of Britain’s best-known entertainers, with a career spanning some 60 years. However, the BBC stands by their reportage of the allegations, and I suspect the BBC will indeed appeal this decision.

As if written for the stage, the Justice Mann’s 120-page judgement begins with a summary of key characters and the plot as it unfolded…

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Daniel Johnson, in front of Sir Cliff’s Berkshire estate

Daniel Johnson, an investigative journalist for the BBC, received a tip-off from a police insider in June 2014 that Sir Cliff was under investigation for historic sex offences against a child. In a manner some would consider blackmail, Johnson “exploited the opportunity to get confirmation of his story about Sir Cliff, and more details if possible” from the South Yorkshire Police (SYP). In exchange for Johnson not publishing the story immediately, the SYP promised that he would be given advance notice of the search of Sir Cliff’s estate. The raid was eventually conducted in August 2014, with BBC crew waiting at the gates and helicopters hovering overhead to capture the whole ordeal.

In case you’re wondering where the Beeb’s lawyers were, the BBC held a meeting to discuss whether to name Sir Cliff and when to broadcast. In her testimony, Senior Editor Fran Unsworth explained that “the legal risk was diminishing because they had got a lot of confirmation of the facts of the story”. The principal legal concern seems to have been in respect of factual accuracy and defamation, and not privacy – as “the lawyers had not flagged that up to her as a specific risk” (para 111).

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the (not very exciting) footage shows plain-clothes police entering Sir Cliff’s estate.
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Three gloved individuals appear to be looking through what is likely Sir Cliff’s office

The legal framework of Sir Cliff’s privacy claim is enshrined in European Convention on Human Rights, brought into force in the UK by the Human Rights Act 1998.

Article 8 sets out the right to privacy: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law […] or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

Article 10 upholds the BBC’s competing rights of expression: “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society [including those] for the protection of the reputation or rights of others.”

In instances where which both Article 8 and Article 10 are engaged, the Court has to perform a balancing and weighing act to ascertain which predominates. Neither article has prima facie precedence over the other.

Article 8 privacy protections arise only where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, if I have a conversation with my friend in a crowded coffee shop in central London, I cannot reasonably expect our discussion to be protected as truly private.

The 77 year-old singer told the Court that he suffered an “unbelievable amount of hurt and pain” after the BBC broadcast the allegations that he had sexually assaulted a boy in 1985. “It felt like torture, sustained over almost two years. It felt as though everything I had done, everything I had built and worked to achieve, was being torn down, like life itself was coming to an end.”

But one might wonder if, as a celebrity, Sir Cliff cannot claim to have an expectation of privacy. A certain amount of emphasis was given by the BBC to the fact that Sir Cliff was a public figure, and one who had promoted his Christian beliefs. Because Sir Cliff had been so vocal (ie public) about Christian morality, the BBC considered that his alleged sexual crimes against a child qualified as a matter of public interest. To that point, the Court acknowledged that in certain special circumstances, the public’s right to be informed can extend into private aspects of public figures (para 276).

However,  Rocknroll v News Group Newspapers [2013] EWHC 24 (Ch) upheld that a public figure is not, by virtue of their fame, necessarily deprived of his or her legitimate expectations of privacy. Axel Springer v Germany 39954/08 [2012] ECHR 227 also makes clear that the safeguard afforded by Article 10 to journalists is subject to the proviso that they are acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis, and that they provide “reliable and precise” information in accordance with the ethics of journalism.

In considering the BBC’s argument that the stories about Sir Cliff had been published in the public interest, the Court disagreed, saying that reporters at the BBC “were far more impressed by the size of the story and that they had the opportunity to scoop their rivals.” (para 280) This echoes the findings in Axel Springer, in that photographs and commentary which expose a person’s private life cannot be considered to have been published in the name of public interest, if they were in fact made public only to “satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership” (Axel Springer, para 48). It is unsurprising in my view that Justice Mann “came to the clear conclusion that Sir Cliff’s privacy rights were not outweighed by the BBC’s rights to freedom of expression” (para 315).

Publicity is the very soul of justice. In the darkness of secrecy, sinister interest and evil in every shape, have full swing. Only in proportion as publicity has place can any of the checks, applicable to judicial injustice, operate. Where there is no publicity there is no justice.

Jeremy Bentham. legal and social reformer (1748 – 1832)

Will this case have a chilling effect on media freedoms? Writing for The Guardian, Professor of Financial Journalism Jane Martinson argues that “as long as the media reports accurately – making it clear when a suspect is under investigation for a serious crime, rather than arrested or charged – there should be no bar to the public knowing what is going on.” However, in my view this fails to take into consideration the complexity of public perception. In his concluding remarks, Justice Mann cited “the failure of the public to keep the presumption of innocence in mind at all times” as an aggravating factor against the BBC.

Other criticisms focus on the point that this case provides an undeserved blanket of anonymity to criminals, providing a way to keep allegations against possible abusers secret. Whether or not there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a police investigation is in actuality fact-sensitive question, and is not capable of a universal answer (para. 237). According to Police Guidance on Relationships with the Media, the names or identifying details of suspects of crime should not be released by police to the press or public, unless special circumstances apply — such as threat to life, the prevention or detection of crime, or a matter of public interest.

The inevitable stigma attached to the extremely serious allegations against Sir Cliff made the invasion of privacy even worse. When an individual’s good reputation is tarnished, even wrongfully, it may never be recoverable. This is especially harmful to celebrities, who rely so heavily on public favour. In my view, Sir Cliff Richards v BBC is not a sweeping new precedent that stifles freedom of the press: it simply restates the statutory protections afforded by the Human Rights Act within the context of already-established European and English case law.

Social network, media company, host provider, neutral intermediary… what’s in a name for YouTube?

Social network, media company, host provider, neutral intermediary… what’s in a name for YouTube?

Media companies who call themselves social networks will have to recognize that they, too, have to take on responsibility for the content with which they earn their millions.

-— Markus Breitenecker, CEO of Puls4

Who is to blame, if someone records TV programmes and illegally uploads them to YouTube: YouTube, or the individual? According to the Commercial Court of Vienna, YouTube is jointly responsible for copyright breaches from user-uploaded content. Is this einer Entscheidung, die das Internet revolutionieren könnte – a decision that could revolutionize the Internet?

To date, the unanimous opinion of European case law supports the position that YouTube is only a platform, an intermediary, a service provider, a neutral host, and so on – and therefore could not bear the responsibility for stolen content. That’s no longer true, says the Handelsgericht Wien (Vienna’s Commercial Court).

In its judgement of 6 June, the Court handed Austrian TV broadcaster Puls4 a key victory in its four-year legal battle with Google-owned YouTube. In 2014, Puls4 had sued YouTube for allowing Puls4’s stolen content to appear on the YouTube platform. YouTube responded by asserting the Host Provider Privilege set out in Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC, which in certain situations shields host providers from being held responsible for the actions of its users.

The Americans have a similar provision in the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA), which forms part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The OCILLA creates a conditional “safe harbor” for online service providers by shielding them for their own acts of direct copyright infringement, as well as from potential secondary liability for the infringing acts of others. In exempting internet actors from copyright infringement liability in certain scenarios,  both Article 14 and the Safe Harbor rule aim to balance the competing interests of the copyright holders, and those who use the content online.

Where YouTube is simply a host provider, it is the individual who uploaded the video in the first instance who is to blame for the theft of copyrighted material. This time, the Court disagreed with YouTube’s argument, and has found finding the media giant to be jointly responsible for the copyright infringement.

So, why should we care about the Puls4 case? Although Austrian case law is not binding for other European Union member states, the Commercial Court’s judgment sets a precedent for denying Host Provider Privilege to YouTube. This may encourage similar decisions in the future which are based on the same line of argument.

Speaking to German newspaper Der Standard, Puls4’s CEO Markus Breitenecker explained that YouTube had effectively abandoned its neutral intermediary position and assumed an active role, which provided it with a knowledge of or control over certain data. In European legislative parlance, this is known as being a false hosting provider or false intermediary.

For years, many of us have assumed that YouTube is just a inanimate platform to which users upload videos. This case underscores that YouTube can no longer “play the role of a neutral intermediary” because of its “links, mechanisms for sorting and filtering, in particular the generation of lists of particular categories, its analysis of users’ browsing habits and its tailor-made suggestions of content.”

Puls4 and YouTube have until early July to petition the court, before it issues its binding ruling. In a statement to The Local Austria, YouTube said it was studying the ruling and “holding all our options open, including appealing” the decision.  In the meanwhile however, YouTube noted that it takes protecting copyrighted work very seriously.

If the preliminary decision is upheld, YouTube must perform a content check upon upload, instead of simply removing copyright infringing content upon notification. In respect of this, the Viennese court stated that “YouTube must in future — through advance controls — ensure that no content that infringes copyright is uploaded.” It is therefore rather timely that YouTube began beta testing a feature called Copyright Match last month, a tool which allows users to scan the platform to locate full re-uploads of their original videos on other users’ YouTube channels.

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some Puls4 content is still available on YouTube (at least, here in the UK).

The European Parliament seems to think the arguments about false hosting providers is best left to the courts to decide. Despite the E-Commerce Directive being more than 15 years old, there is no pressing need for a reform. In a recent report on the matter,  the European Parliament’s Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection stated that while false hosting providers may not have been envisaged at the time of the adoption of the E-Commerce Directive in 2000, “the delineation between passive service providers caught by Article 14 and active role providers remains an issue for the court.”

 

 

Lights, camera, data protection.

Lights, camera, data protection.

Cannes: movie stars, auteurs, glamour, the French Riviera, and… data privacy?

Before the cameras start rolling, a film production company will need to agree service contracts for cast and crew.  In honour of the Cannes Film Festival happening this week, let’s consider how data protection issues need to be addressed for an actor’s contract.

A standard Actor’s agreement will cover payment, travel and residence allowances, box office bonuses, and of course, intellectual property.  But if the production company intends to process a significant amount of personal data about the Actor – such as dates and locations of filming, and details of travel arrangements and accommodation –  the agreement should also contain a data protection clause.  Remember that “processing” is widely defined, and covers any activity involving personal data, including storing, sharing, or reading.

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The Cannes 2018 poster, featuring an image from Jean-Luc Godard’s 1965 film “Pierrot le Fou.”

“The Actor agrees and hereby give her consent to the holding and processing of personal data relating to the Actor in any form, whether obtained or held in writing, electronically or otherwise, by the Producer.”

The above clause may be acceptable under the UK Data Protection Act 1998, but is problematic under the incoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Consent. As worded above, the Actor is providing the Producer with blanket consent to process her personal data.  Under the GDPR, consent means “freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her” (Art. 4(11)).

Given that this is a contract between a prospective employee and her boss, there is an imbalance of power between the parties. Accordingly, the Actor’s consent statement is unlikely to be considered “freely given” as is required under the GDPR.  Furthermore, personal data processing should neither be disguised nor bundled with the provision of a contract (Art 7(4)).

Even in other contexts, it would be unwise to rely on the Actor’s consent for processing, as this can cause difficulties if consent is withdrawn at a later date.  It is therefore advisable to rely on another lawful basis.

Another lawful basis? “Lawful basis” is just another way of saying “reason to do something.” Consent is just one of the six lawful bases permitted (Art. 6 GDPR). As the conditions for consent are very strict and unlikely to be met in this scenario, the Producers should consider their other options:

  • Contract: Processing is necessary for a contract with the person. Employment contracts are certainly applicable in this instance: for example, the Producers must process the Actor’s bank details to pay her.
  • Legal obligation: Processing is necessary for the Producers to comply with the law. This could include their tax obligations for HMRC, or complying with money laundering regulations.
  • Legitimate interests: The Producers must process the data for their legitimate interests. This could include business purposes such as sending out publicity emails with the Actor’s name and contact details, posting her image on social media, and so on. This is the most flexible basis to rely upon, but requires the Producers to demonstrate (inter alia) that their objectives are not unreasonable, and do not harm the Actor’s human rights (Recital 47).
  • The other lawful bases of protecting vital interests and carrying out a public task are not applicable in our scenario, but worth noting for completeness.

To be GDPR compliant, the clause could be amended to something like:

The Producers will collect and process the Actor‘s personal data in accordance with the Privacy Notice annexed to this Agreement. The Actor will sign and date the Privacy Notice and return it to the Executive Producer within 10 days of signing this Agreement.

The purpose of the Policy Notice is to provide the ActorActor with the information she is entitled to receive as a data subject (Articles 13 and 14). The Privacy Notice, likely to take the form of a letter, will explain how the Producer obtains, uses, and retains the Actor’s personal data. It will also set out the relevant lawful bases for each type of processing, and explain how the Actor can exercise her rights (Articles 15 through 22 inclusive).

Of course, the work doesn’t end once the agreement is signed. The Producers will need to make sure anyone who handles personal data within their organisation understands the new requirements under the GDPR. Having clear policies is only part of the story: those policies will need to be followed.

It’s a common misconception that the GDPR is just about IT security and marketing emails filling up your inbox. In reality, the legislation will provide enhanced rights for data subjects, and it’s important to remember that employees are data subjects too.